

NSC BRIEFING

2 October 1956

TITO'S BLACK SEA "VACATION"

- I. A week ago, in theorizing about the motives underlying the exchange of visits by Khrushchev and Tito, we concluded that all the Soviet leaders are feeling concern over the consequences of the USSR's recent policy regarding the Eastern European satellites and the USSR's resumption of friendly relations with Yugoslavia.
 - A. We also concluded that it would be overly optimistic to believe that the Soviet leadership is facing a crisis over these issues.
- II. During the past week, we have received enough information regarding the Khrushchev-Tito talks in Yugoslavia, as well as sufficient preliminary reporting on the Black Sea conferences now in progress, to permit some revision of last week's conclusions.
 - A. We still hold the opinion that, as regards affairs in the Eastern European satellites, there is no present split in the Soviet leadership.
 - B. However, we believe that relations between the USSR and Yugoslavia have reached a crisis point.
 - C. The points of doctrine involved in this crisis are such that an eventual split in the USSR's "collective leadership" over this issue appears to be a distinct ~~future~~ possibility.
- III. The fact that both problems are intimately related makes it difficult to deal with them separately. However, the question of the Eastern European satellites should be dealt with first. *y*

DOCUMENT NO. _____
 NO CHANGE IN CLASS. ☐
 X DECLASSIFIED
 CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C
 NEXT REVIEW DATE: _____
 AUTH: HR 70-2
 DATE: 1-14-80 REVIEWER: 372044

~~SECRET~~

A. All the evidence indicates that the Soviet leaders have agreed that some form of action must be taken to reassert Soviet control in the two satellites that have shown the sharpest trend toward "over-democratization" and "independence"-- Poland and Hungary. This tougher policy was probably formulated by the Soviet leadership some time before the Khrushchev-Tito talks began.

B. During the past summer, the USSR clearly warned both these satellites that they had outstepped the proper limits to internal "democratization" and to independence from the USSR. Among these warnings were:

1. Soviet propaganda emphasizing "international Communist unity" and attacking "national Communism."
2. Bulganin's mid-July speech in Warsaw, condemning "anti-party" trends in the Communist press and reasserting that the Poznan riots were inspired by "imperialist agents" (in contrast to the Polish admission that their cause was economic).
3. A third warning was contained in the September Central Committee letters to the Satellites, which we mentioned last week. These letters warned the Satellites to use the USSR, and not Yugoslavia, as their model, and declared that the Yugoslav concept of "independent roads" to socialism was ^{NOT} to be accepted.

IV. Although the other Satellites appear to be hewing closely to the Soviet line, these warnings apparently have had little or no effect in Hungary, and if anything a reverse effect in Poland.

A. In Poland, the internal "democratization" program is going ahead without pause.

1. Press criticism continues unabated.
2. The Polish regime apparently is encouraging a new and more independent evaluation of Poland's relations with the USSR.
3. The Poles are also taking a closer and more favorable look at both Yugoslav independence and economic practices.

B. In Hungary, the "democratization" trend was given great impetus in July by the ouster of Rakosi--which Moscow had tried to forestall.

1. The trend accelerated during September and has now reached a point which, according to the US Legation in Budapest, will necessitate Soviet intervention lest it get completely out of hand.

C. Thus, the strong Soviet reassertion of control, on which we believe all Soviet leaders are agreed, must come soon.

V. As to the doctrinal conflict with Tito, it is now evident that the very large gap between Soviet and Yugoslav views exposed during Khrushchev's Brioni visit were the cause of Tito's hasty return trip to Yalta.

25X1X A. Yugoslav [REDACTED] told the

25X1X7 [REDACTED] on 29 September that the attitude of the Soviet party boss on the proper future course for the satellites had been uncompromising.

25X1X B. According [REDACTED] Khrushchev displayed such a reversal of the former Soviet line that Tito threatened to publish each country's position.

~~SECRET~~

25X1X

1. At this point--according [REDACTED]--Khrushchev invited Tito to come to the USSR to discuss the Soviet position further.

25X1X 2. [REDACTED] said that Tito accepted in the hope that he could persuade the Soviet leaders to reverse their new "tough" satellite policy.

25X1X C. [REDACTED] concluded that, while Molotov and others had always opposed the policy of wooing Yugoslavia, Khrushchev's hard line made it clear that the majority of Soviet leaders, including Khrushchev, have now come around to agree with Molotov.

D. The Soviet leaders, in their turn, will try to convince Tito that the problem in Eastern Europe is not just one of lesser or greater satellite independence, but one that threatens Communism itself.

1. They can be expected to point out that Polish and Hungarian trends contain the seeds of a Western bourgeois heresy, much like the Djilas heresy Tito has suppressed in Yugoslavia.

VI. But the present Yugoslav-Soviet crisis goes deeper than the question of satellite "evolution"--it is over whether or not the Yugoslavs' independent "national Communism" is doctrinally acceptable ^{to} the USSR. This dilemma for the USSR, which overshadows its relations with all of Eastern Europe, could lead to an eventual turnover in the leadership of the Soviet party and state.

A. Khrushchev and his chief lieutenants, Bulganin and Mikoyan, will lose considerable prestige if they have to start reneging on their "liberalization" program.

1. They stand to lose even more if, in the process, they experience severe difficulties in restoring control over the satellites or if Tito is alienated.
 2. In this event, the Molotov hard line might be expected to win increased support.
- B. Any such turnover in the Soviet leadership, however, will take considerable time.
1. An "opposition" to Khrushchev would need a prominent and effective Leader--but we see no such person on the stage at present.
 - a. Malenkov's resignation and self-criticism appears to rule him out.
 - b. Molotov's multiple recantations apparently dispose of him.
 - c. The fact that Kaganovich, another possible "opposition" figure, is a Jew makes him a most unlikely candidate.
 2. Zhukov, the closest to a genuinely popular figure in all the USSR, has been aligned with Khrushchev in the wooing of Tito.
 3. Finally, none of these figures is now in a position to build up a strong following within the all-important party organization.

ISC BRIEFING

3 October 1956

*Pres
inside volume
for file*

*loc 180 - 4
- 1st file*

*5/3 - show
- 72 pages
- alliance
- relations
- plan
- military*

TITO'S BLACK SEA "VACATION"

25X6

- I. During the past week, we have received some "inside" information on the talks between Khrushchev and Tito in Yugoslavia, as well as a few preliminary details on the two leaders' subsequent Black Sea discussions.
- II. These talks evidently stem from a recent agreement among the Soviet leaders that some form of action must be taken to reassert Soviet control in the two Satellites that have shown the sharpest trend toward "over-democratization" and "independence"--Poland and Hungary.

III. We have information that the very large gap between Soviet and Yugoslav views on this subject, expressed during Khrushchev's Brioni visit, was the cause of Tito's hasty return trip to Yalta.

A. On 29 September, the Yugoslav [REDACTED]

25X1X 25X1X7 [REDACTED] told the [REDACTED] of Khrushchev's new stand at Brioni. The Soviet party boss, discussing with Tito the proper future course for the satellites, made an uncompromising reversal of the doctrine of "independent roads to socialism."

25X1X B. According [REDACTED] this was so surprising that Tito threatened to publish each country's contrasting ^{problems} position.

25X1X

1. At this point--according [REDACTED]--Khrushchev invited Tito to come to the USSR to discuss the Soviet position further.

25X1X

2. [REDACTED] said that Tito accepted in the hope that he could persuade the Soviet leaders to reverse their tough Satellite policy.

25X1X

C. [REDACTED] pointed out that Molotov and others had always opposed

25X1X

the policies of wooing Yugoslavia and "moderating" Soviet control of the satellites. [REDACTED] concluded that Khrushchev's new hard line made it clear that the majority of Soviet leaders, including Khrushchev himself, ^{have} has now come around to agree with Molotov.

IV. The Yalta "vacationers" increased in number on 30 September when Premier Bulganin arrived--undoubtedly to help Khrushchev try to convince Tito that the problem in Eastern Europe is not just one of lesser or greater Satellite independence, but one that threatens Communism itself.

A. Hungarian party boss Gerö--who arrived at the same time as Bulganin--was probably brought in to reinforce the argument that Polish and Hungarian trends contain the seeds of a Western bourgeois heresy, much like the Djilas heresy Tito has suppressed in Yugoslavia

Meanwhile, Soviet officials in Moscow have indicated that a plenary session of the party central committee will be held sometime this month.

The current concentration of Soviet effort on the Eastern European problem makes it likely that this issue will be the major item on the agenda.

B At the plenum, Khrushchev, as the party boss, can be expected to seek to reconcile any disagreements within the hierarchy as to Soviet policy toward Tito.

The foregoing information summarizes this week's developments in the complex story of Soviet-Yugoslav relations. This is by no means the whole story.

A We need more evidence. ^{part of} An essential bit of evidence will be Tito's attitude and statements on his return.